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It has been argued by Turunen-Red and Woodland that, on only mild empirical assumptions, 
any system of non-distorting international transfers can be replaced by an “equivalent set” of 
distorting national tariffs without disturbing the international allocation of resources.  This 
remarkable claim is disputed on the ground that the assumptions required for equivalence are not 
mild, that in particular they rule out quite plausible models of Arrow-Debreu type, and on the 
further ground that, in a context of non-uniqueness, a set of tariffs which supports an initial transfer-
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Consider a unique world-wide transfer-ridden but otherwise Arrow-Debreu free-trade 
equilibrium, which will be referred to as the initial equilibrium.  It has been claimed recently that, 
subject to a “mild restriction” on the matrix of equilibrium net exports (each column composed of 
the net exports of a single country), the transfers can be replaced by a set of equivalent tariff 
vectors, one vector for each country, such that there exists a new equilibrium, tariff-ridden but 
transfer-free, with new world prices but the initial domestic prices, with the initial matrix of net 
exports and with the initial vector of national utilities; see Turunen-Red and Woodland (1999).  
Subject to the “mild restriction”, the international redistribution of income effected by lumpsum and 
non-distorting international transfers can be equally-well effected by carefully-chosen distorting 
taxes on international trade.
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The claim is quite remarkable.  For, in tandem with the Second Welfare Theorem, it implies 
that any improvement in technology or in endowments, in whatever country, can be converted into 
a world-wide Pareto-improvement either by a cooperative program of international aid or by the 
cooperative reform of tariffs, the program of aid driving the world economy along its new contract 
locus to a Pareto-superior initial equilibrium and then giving way to the reformed tariffs.  The claim 
is also surprising for it comes hard on the heels of a considerable debate concerning the relative 
merits of lumpsum and non-lumpsum compensation of those who are harmed by the introduction of 
free international trade.  That debate had been provoked by the claim of Dixit and Norman (1980) 
that if economy-wide gains from free trade can be assured by a scheme of intra-national lumpsum 
compensating transfers then they can also be assured by a set of carefully chosen commodity taxes.  
In the course of that debate it emerged that the equivalence of lumpsum and non-lumpsum 
compensation holds only under special conditions; see Kemp and Wan (1986, 1993, 1999), Dixit 
and Norman (1986), Hammond and Sempere (1995) and Wan (1997). 
 
  In the present paper it will be shown by example that the “mild restriction” imposed by 
Turunen-Red and Woodland rules out economies with no extravagant (non-Arrow-Debreu) features 
but for which, nevertheless, equivalent tariff vectors do not exist.  It will be further noted that (a) 
tariffs that support an initial transfer-ridden allocation might also support disparate additional 
allocations and that (b) the analytical method adopted by Turunen-Red and Woodland, based as it is 
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allocations, implying that, in a context of non-uniqueness, their method is inappropriate. 
 
  More constructively it will be shown that, under plausible assumptions concerning the 
relative numbers of countries, traded commodities and primary factors of production, there is no 
presumption for or against tariff equivalence. 
 
2.  The Turunen-Red-Woodland proposition 
 
Let us denote by X the matrix of net exports in an initial free-trading but transfer-ridden 
equilibrium.  From Motzkin’s theorem of the alternative, either (a) the set of inequalities Xλ>0 has 
a solution or (b) there is a semi-positive solution to the system of equations þX=0; see Motzkin 
(1936) or Mangasarian (1969).  Turunen-Red and Woodland assume that (a) is not satisfied by X; 
this is the “mild restriction” embodied in their Assumption (A).  On the basis of that assumption, 





Turunen-Red and Woodland then abandon the transfers and seek a new tariff-ridden 
equilibrium in which all countries are just as well off as in the initial equilibrium.  Provisionally, 
they accept þ †  as the new vector of world prices and choose the tariff vectors of the trading 
countries so that, given þ †, domestic prices must settle at their initial levels.  They then note that if 
domestic prices and utilities are unchanged so will be all excess supplies; and that if excess supplies 




That completes our summary of the Turunen-Red-Woodland argument.    In Section 3 we 
shall present a simple example involving pure exchange and homothetic preferences but with no 
extraordinary features.  In the example there are no equivalent tariffs.  The example therefore fails 
to satisfy Assumption (A) and casts doubt on the mildness of that assumption. 
 
3. Assessment 
  As noted in the Introduction, our assessment of the Turunen-Red-Woodland proposition 
rests on our misgivings concerning the plausibility of their “mild restriction” on the matrix of 
equilibrium net exports and concerning the relevance of their Motzkin-based analytical method in a 
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means of a simple example of Arrow-Debreu type which nevertheless does not satisfy the “mild 
restriction” and does not yield a set of equivalent tariffs. 
 
3.1 An  example 
We propose a world of just three trading countries:  A, for ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States); O, for OPEC; and F, for the FIS (Federation of Independent States).  Each 
country behaves like a single consumer, possibly because each has in place a scheme of lumpsum 
compensation which ensures that either all inhabitants of that country benefit or all suffer when the 
country is disturbed by policy or other changes to its environment. 
 
There are two commodities, food and oil, with oil serving as numeraire.  Neither commodity 
is produced; each is available in fixed world supply.  Country A is the sole supplier of food, with an 
endowment which, by choice of units, is equal to  1. Countries F and O are the only sources of oil, 
with endowments which, by choice of units, are equal to ¼ and ¾, respectively. 
 
  The utility function of A is 
             ( 1 a)
2/3 1/3 A ux y =
 




F uxy ′′ =
          (1b)
 
and 
            (1c) 
01 / 3 (x ) (y ) u ′′ ′′ =
2 / 3
 
where x′and   denote F’s consumption of food and oil, respectively, and y′ x′′  and   denote O’s 
consumption of food and oil, respectively.  We have chosen homogeneous utility functions for 
convenience; general homothetic functions would have been inconvenient but equally decisive. 
y′′
 
  Let us consider an initial world equilibrium in which A and F are free traders but O imposes 
an import duty.  By construction, the equilibrium consumption vector of A is taken to be (x,y)=(2/3, 
1/5).  Since A trades freely, the equilibrium world price ratio must be equal to A’s marginal rate of 
substitution at (2/3, 1/5); that is, 
 
p
0 = 2y/x  =  2(1/5)/(2/3)=3/5         (2) 
lec\kemp lumpsum versus 15 January 2003  4Given the price ratio p
0, the consumption vector of F, which also trades freely, is 
.  By market clearance, the consumption vector of O must then be (7/36, 
19/30).  To support consumption at that point, the domestic price ratio in O must be 
 implying a rate of tariff of [
(,) ( 5 / 3 6 , 1 / 6 ) xy ′′ =
/(2 ) 57/35, yx ′′ ′′ = (57/35) (3/5)]/(3/5) 12/7. − =  
 
Thus, by construction, the initial equilibrium is at e
0 in Figure 1.  Because of O’s tariff, the 
allocation of e
0 is inefficient.  By eliminating the tariff and  introducing a suitable scheme of inter-
country GMG compensation based on the initial consumption of the three countries, the world 
economy could be moved to  , a Pareto-improving point on the world contract locus.  (In Figure 
1,   indicates the consumption of country j, j=A,F,O.)  Since initially F was free riding on the 
aggressive behaviour of O, in the new equilibrium F would enjoy more than one-third of the utility 





## , } )], (1/3)[(2/3) (1/5)]} ## { {(2/3)[(2/3) 1/(5 xy p p + =+    ( 3 a) 




## # # { , } {(1/3)[(7/36) 19/(30 )], (2/3)[(7/36) (19/30)]} xy p p ′′ ′′ =+ +    (3c) 
 
respectively.  In market-clearing equilibrium, 
 




## # 1 yyy ′′ ′ ++=           ( 4 b) 
 
Substituting from (3) into either (4a) or (4b) and solving for  # p , we find that
 
 
# 9/10 p =            ( 5 )  
 
Hence, substituting for  # p  in (3), we arrive at the equilibrium world consumption matrix 
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where the first, second and third columns relate to A, F and O, respectively, and where food 
consumption is recorded in the first row, oil consumption in the second.  Making use of (6), it can 
be verified that, at e , F consumes more than one-third of O’s consumption of each commodity.  #
 
Suppose now that the three countries seek to find the tariff vector that is equivalent to the 
scheme of GMG compensation.  They will fail in their quest.  For the MFN clause ensures that F 
and O will be treated equally, so that in any tariff-ridden final equilibrium F will enjoy exactly one-
third of O’s utility.  Alternatively, from (6) and the endowments of the three countries, one can 
calculate that the matrix of equilibrium exports in the compensated equilibrium is 






and that the equation 
   1 2 p p   0 = X  
has no semi-positive solution. 
 
That completes the presentation of our example.  In the example, countries outnumber 
commodities.  However similar examples can be constructed without that special feature.  Thus one 






Any attempt to establish tariff equivalence must confront the possibility that an international 
equilibrium, whether transfer-ridden but tariff-free or transfer-free but tariff-ridden, lacks 
uniqueness.  Let us focus on a particular transfer-ridden but tariff-free initial world equilibrium and 
on a particular set of tariff vectors which can support the initial allocation in the absence of 
transfers.  Then it must be recognised that the tariffs might also support several other transfer-free 
allocations, each quite different from that of the initial equilibrium.  Moreover this problem can 
appear even in the familiar two-by-two case; see, for example, Kemp and Wan (2002).  The 
Turunen-Red-Woodland Motzkin-based method simply excludes all other equilibrium allocations 
and world prices.  It therefore must be judged to be inadequate in a context of multiple equilibria. 
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We have argued by example that the key assumption introduced by Turunen-Red and 
Woodland is not well described as “mild” and have suggested that their appeal to Motzkin’s 
theorem may be inappropriate.  In the present section we offer an alternative approach to the 
problem posed by Turunen-Red and Woodland and argue that if, realistically, N>M>2 then 
there is no presumption for or against tariff equivalence.  We begin by considering three 
familiar special cases. 
 
Case (i)  Let us begin with the simplest case of two countries and two commodities(M=N=2).  
The matrix X  of exports in the compensated free trade equilibrium contains terms which may 
be positive or negative.  Market clearance ensures that each row of X sums to zero, implying 
that (a) each row contains terms of opposite sign but equal magnitude and (b) that the columns 
of X and therefore the rows of X are collinear.  It follows that there exists a two-dimensional 
non-null vector p such that pX=0.  If and only if each column of X contains terms of opposite 
sign, p>0 and equivalent tariffs exist.  However it is also possible that X contains columns both 
terms of which are of the same sign (as when the recipient country chooses to import both 
commodities and the donor country chooses to export both commodities).  In that sub-case, p 
must contain terms of opposite sign; p cannot be semi-positive and equivalent tariffs do not 
exist. 
 
Case (ii)  Consider the next case (familiar from Section 3) in which three countries trade in 
two commodities(M=3, N=2).  In this case, the rows of X are not necessarily collinear.  If in fact 
the rows are not collinear then equivalent tariffs do not exist.  If the rows are collinear then 
there exists a non-null p such that pX=0.  If and only if each column of X contains terms of 
opposite sign, p>0 and equivalent tariffs exist.  However it is also possible that X contains a 
column both terms of which are of the same sign.  In that sub-case, p must contain terms of 
opposite sign; that is, p cannot be semi-positive and equivalent tariffs do no exist.  This 
reasoning applies whenever M>N=2. 
 
Case(iii)  Suppose finally that three countries trade in three commodities (M=3=N).  As in the 
first case considered, the columns of X, and therefore its rows, are necessarily collinear.  Hence 
there exists a non-null p such that pX=0.  If any column of X contains only negative terms or 
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only positive terms then p must contain terms of opposite sign; that is, p cannot be semi-positive 
and equivalent tariffs do not exist.  If no column contains only negative or only positive terms then 
there may or may not exist a semi-positive p and equivalent tariffs.  Moreover this reasoning 
applies whenever  ; indeed it applies whenever  2 MN => ,2 MN N ≤ > . 
 
The above calculations confirm that equivalent tariffs may or may not exist.  More 
important, they provide us with the insight that the existence of equivalent tariffs is sensitive to the 
relative numbers of commodities and countries and to the possibility that some country has only 
negative or only positive exports.  We now try to build on those insights by adding to them a small 
dose of casual empiricism.  
 
  Suppose then that 2<M<N and that each country imports at least one commodity and exports 
at least one commodity.  These assumptions might well be accepted as “mild”. Moreover, as 
already noted, the assumptions ensure that the rows of X are collinear and that each column of X 
contains at least one positive and one negative term.  However they do not ensure the existence of 




  In this section, we have assumed that each element of X is either positive or negative.  The 
section could be reworked to accommodate the possibility that some elements are zero; the 
conclusions would change only in minor detail.  If a whole row were null (a non-traded 
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Footnote 
1  Turunen-Red and Woodland allow for the possibility that there are tariffs in the initial 
situation.  However they do not rule out the special case of free trade. 
 
2  A more detailed argument in support of this statement may be obtained from the authors. 
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